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Michael Smith has recently developed an account of categorical normative reasons for action. Smith argues 
that particular desires are constitutive of ideal agency and draws on his past work on the nature of reasons 
to establish the normative significance of these desires for all agents. According to a sustained critique by 
Michael Bukowski, not only is Smith unable to defend several key premises needed to show these desires 
are constitutive of ideal agency, he is also unable to rely on his previous work to establish the normative 
significance of such constitutive desires. On the contrary, I argue not only that Smith has these resources, 






In a series of recent papers,i Michael Smith claims to “derive a substantive account of normative 
reasons for action from abstract premises about the nature of action and agency.”ii According to 
Smith, it is constitutive of being an agent to have the function of being a desire-realizer equipped 
with the following pair of rational capacities: “to know the world in which they live and [to] realize 
their final desires in it.”iii Ideal agents, then, are those who maximally satisfy the norms “to which 
an agent conforms when he fully and robustly exercises this pair of capacities.”iv Smith argues that 
ideally exercising these capacities requires the intrinsic desires to “not interfere with anyone’s 
current or future exercise of their rational capacities, and [to do] what she currently can to see to 
it that anyone who lacks such capacities acquires and maintains them.”v Because of this, Smith 
concludes that having these desires is “partially constitutive of what it is to have an ideal 
psychology.”vi  
 There are, of course, well-known objections to Constitutivists’ claims that being constitutive 
of agency is of normative significance. Among constitutivists, Smith’s explanation of the normative 
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significance of the desires he argues are constitutive of ideal agency is distinctive for its explicit 
reliance on an independently defended account of normative reasons. According to Smith’s recent 
arguments, the desires to help and not hinder are constitutive of ideal agents, and so our idealized 
counterparts would all have these desires. Because Smith has previously defended an account on 
which our normative reasons are a function of the desires of our idealized counterparts,vii he takes 
these recent arguments to establish that all agents have reason to help and not hinder, regardless 
of their actual contingent desires.viii Moreover, given the “striking similarity” between actions 
motivated by these desires and those we take to be morally required, he concludes that all agents 
have reason to do what is morally required.ix  
 Michael Bukowski has developed a pressing set of objections to Smith’s constitutivist 
account.x In his Normativity Objection, Bukowski objects that Smith cannot rely on his 
dispositional account of reasons to establish the normative authority of the desires he has argued 
are constitutive of ideal agency.xi In his Circularity Objection, Bukowski also argues that Smith 
relies on two undefended assumptions in arguing that the impartial, atemporal desires to help and 
not hinder are constitutive of ideal agency: the “robustness thesis” and the “symmetry thesis.”xii 
According to the former, an ideal agent “has what it takes to remain ideal insofar as this is under 
her control.”xiii According to the latter, an “agent’s relationship to other people is not relevantly 
different from her relationship to her future self.”xiv Bukowski objects that Smith is unable to defend 
these theses without ad hoc commitments to the nature of agency or question-begging assumptions 
about moral impartiality. In either case, Smith’s claim to derive a substantive account of normative 
reasons from abstract premises about the nature of agency would fail. 
   Though I am not convinced Smith’s project ultimately succeeds, these objections do not 
appreciate the explanatory resources of the structure of Smith’s account. In Section II, I respond 
to the Normativity Objection on Smith’s behalf. I argue that it overlooks a straightforward way for 
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Smith to rely on his dispositional account of reasons to establish the normative significance of any 
desire he shows to be constitutive of ideal agency. I argue, in Section III, that functional accounts, 
like Smith’s, have non-ad hoc resources to explain the robustness thesis. In Section IV, I develop 
Smith’s argument for the impartiality of desires constitutive of ideal agency, showing that it does 
not rely on the symmetry thesis, as Bukowski has claimed.  
 In my view, whether Smith’s constitutivist account ultimately succeeds depends on his ability 
to defend his particular functional account of agency and his dispositional account of reasons. In 
the meantime, I hope to show that the form of Smith’s constitutivist account promises under-
appreciated explanatory benefits.   
  
II. THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSTITUTIVE FEATURES  
In his Normativity Objection, Bukowski argues that Smith cannot account for the normative 
significance of being a desire constitutive of ideal agency by drawing on his arguments about the 
rational significance of the desires of our ideal counterparts. According to Bukowski, this strategy 
involves an essential equivocation on “ideal agency.”xv Smith has recently argued that some desires 
are constitutive of the psychology of ideal agents, what Bukowski calls “kind-ideal agents,” which 
are “excellent agent[s] according to the constitutive standards of agency.”xvi Smith’s dispositional 
account of reasons, however, demonstrates the normative significance of the desires of our fully 
rational counterparts, which Bukowski calls “rational-ideal agents.”xvii  Given this difference in the 
two arguments, showing that a desire is constitutive of kind-ideal agency does not establish its 
connection to our reasons, given that our reasons are a function of the desires of our rational-ideal 
counterparts. 
 Bukowski considers and rejects two strategies that Smith could use to establish the normative 
significance of desires constitutive of kind-ideal agents. First, Bukowski claims Smith cannot 
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establish that kind-ideal and rational-ideal agency are extensionally equivalent.xviii Second, 
Bukowski argues that Smith cannot apply the argument he uses to establish the normative 
significance of the desire sets of rational-ideal agents mutatis mutandis to kind-ideal agents.xix 
Bukowski concludes that Smith cannot vindicate his explanatory strategy for establishing the 
normative significance of desires constitutive of kind-ideal agents.xx 
 Bukowski’s conclusion, however, is too quick. At most he has shown that Smith cannot 
establish the normative significance of desires constitutive of kind-ideal agents by demonstrating 
the normative significance of their desire sets. But kind-ideal agents can have many desires which 
are not constitutive of their status as kind-ideal, and Smith only needs to establish the normative 
significance of their constitutive desires.xxi Bukowski does not consider whether Smith might 
demonstrate the normative significance of desires constitutive of kind-ideal agency without 
establishing the normative significance of the rest. Because of this, he does not consider whether 
Smith could show that rational-ideal counterparts are guaranteed to have any desire constitutive 
of kind-ideal agency, merely in virtue of their rational-ideal status.xxii Let’s call this “the simple 
connection.”xxiii Establishing the simple connection would vindicate Smith’s explanatory strategy 
of explaining the normative significance of desires constitutive of kind-ideal agency by appeal to 
his dispositional account of reasons.  
 Desires constitutive of kind-ideal agency are those required by the internal standards of 
agency—those that make an agent better qua agent in virtue of satisfying them. In his recent 
constitutivist arguments, Smith explains that we should “think of an agent as a functional kind, 
defined by the possession and exercise, to some degree or other, of the capacities to know the world 
in which he lives and realize his desires in it, and hence think of the norms governing the 
idealization as those to which an agent conforms when he fully and robustly possesses and exercises 
this pair of capacities.”xxiv So, if a desire is required by the internal standards of agency, kind-ideal 
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agents are guaranteed to have that desire because it is needed to ensure they are able to ideally 
possess and exercise their rational capacities.xxv  Constitutive desires of kind-ideal agency are thus 
those that are required to ensure that the capacities with which we deliberate and realize our desires 
are ideally able to serve that function. If the simple connection holds, all rational-ideal counterparts 
will be guaranteed to have any such desires.   
 As Bukowski notes, Smith originally introduces what Bukowski terms “rational-ideal agents” 
as counterparts who are ideally situated to make good decisions about what is desirable, enabling 
their desires to constitute our reasons.xxvi So, for example, Smith explains that rational-ideal agents 
must have all relevant true beliefs because they ideally situate an agent to make good decisions 
about what is desirable. Ignorant or misinformed counterparts who manage to desire what is 
desirable are lucky. Changes that remove this reliance on luck are rational improvements, because 
they make a counterpart more likely to desire what they have reason to desire, and so counterparts 
who are relevantly fully informed are more rational than those who are not.xxvii So, being fully 
relevantly informed is a cognitive condition on being a rational-ideal agent.  
 Given Smith’s functional understanding of agency, we can similarly see that having desires 
constitutive of kind-ideal agency is a conative condition on being ideally situated to make good 
decisions about what is desirable. After all, a counterpart who lacked a desire constitutive of agency 
would thereby not be fully equipped to ensure they ideally co-exercise their rational capacities—
those capacities essentially used to deliberate about and realize what is desirable. In particular, 
without such coherence-inducing desires an agent could find herself in a situation where her desires 
are best realized at the cost of the ideal exercise of her deliberative capacities. Without assurance 
against such self-sabotaging exercises, an agent might undermine her ability to form true beliefs, 
including beliefs about what is desirable.xxviii Counterparts without these desires who end up with 
accurate beliefs about what is desirable are lucky, and this form of luck is disqualifying for rational-
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ideal agents on the same grounds as before. Changes that remove reliance on luck in forming 
accurate beliefs about what is desirable are rational improvements, and are required in our 
rational-ideal counterparts, whose desires constitute facts about what is desirable for us.  So, having 
coherence-inducing desires is a conative condition on being a rational-ideal agent for the same 
reason that being relevantly fully informed is a cognitive condition: both are rational improvements 
needed to ensure true beliefs about what is desirable is not due to luck.   
 This then vindicates the simple connection. Discovering that a desire for something is 
constitutive of being a kind-ideal agent is a way to discover that your rational-ideal counterpart 
desires it, in the same way that discovering there is a relevant truth is a way to discover that they 
believe it. So, if Smith is able to establish that some desires are constitutive of kind-ideal agency, 
he can rely on his explanatory strategy and appeal to his dispositional account of reasons to explain 
their normative significance.   
 
III. THE DEMANDINGNESS OF ATELIC FUNCTIONS  
Of course, this vindication of the normative significance of being a desire constitutive of kind-ideal 
agency might be a hollow victory, because Bukowski also argues that Smith fails to establish that 
any desires are constitutive of kind-ideal agency in the first place. Bukowski notes that in his recent 
arguments Smith assumes that an ideal agent “has what it takes to remain ideal insofar as this is 
under her control,” what Bukowski calls “the robustness thesis.”xxix However, as Bukowski notes, 
it is not generally true that functional kinds and capacities ought to be self-maintaining. For 
example “a good missile is not one that above all else maintains itself indefinitely into the future, 
but instead one that destroys itself… as a means to accomplish some aim.”xxx Bukowski objects that 
without a principled explanation of this difference between agents and missiles, the robustness 
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thesis amounts to adopting “without sufficient justification, the characterization of agency that 
seems better suited for deriving moral requirements.”xxxi 
  Bukowski correctly notes that many functional capacities need not be indefinitely self-
maintaining, what we can call “unrestrictedly robust.” However, he has overlooked a central 
feature of functional constitutivist accounts of agency that can explain why agentive capacities must 
be unrestrictedly robust: namely, that the function of agency is atelic in character. All functional 
capacities, I’ll argue, have some minimal robustness demands, but the atelic nature of the function 
of agency can be used to explain why the robustness demands on agents are unrestricted. If this is 
correct, then the robustness thesis is true. 
  Though ideal functional capacities need not have what it takes to maintain themselves 
indefinitely, they must all have what it takes to maintain themselves until they’ve completed their 
contribution to the performance of their function. So, what I’ll call the “restricted robustness thesis” 
is true of all ideal functional capacities. Consider, for instance, the missile whose infrared heat-
seeking capacity guides the missile to its target, contributing to its own destruction. Bukowski is 
certainly right that a good infrared heat-seeking capacity need not maintain itself indefinitely into 
the future. But it should maintain itself long enough to play its role in directing the missile to the 
target. It must be restrictedly, though not unrestrictedly, robust. So, if we can show that agentive 
capacities make ongoing contributions to a function that is never completed, we can explain the 
truth of the robustness thesis as a special case of this restricted robustness result. 
 Smith provides resources for an explanation of unrestricted robustness in his understanding 
of the temporal duration of agents. He writes “…given that they may well exist over time, ideal 
agents must also be in the present such that they can possess and exercise their epistemic and 
desiderative capacities in the future.”xxxii This explanation of the temporally extended nature of 
agency can explain how the agentive capacities play an ongoing role in the performance of the 
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function of agency.xxxiii But in order to understand how the function of agency is never completed 
we need to understand its atelic character.  
  Kieran Setiya nicely explains the difference between telic and atelic activity in terms of 
completion.xxxiv On his account, telic activity types are those that “one can finish doing, or 
complete,” because it is part of the activity that it “aim[s] at a point of termination or exhaustion: 
a final state in which they have been achieved and there is no more to do.”xxxv Atelic activities, in 
contrast, are types of activities that, as far as the structure of the activity is concerned, could go on 
forever. Telling a joke is a telic activity; it aims at a punch line (say). After the punch line, your only 
joke-telling option is to tell another, because the first one is over. In contrast, spending time with 
friends is atelic; it doesn’t aim at some state that, once you’ve reached it, you have to start hanging 
out with friends again, because the first hang out is over. As Setiya points out, when you engage in 
atelic activities, “you can stop doing these things, and eventually you will, but you cannot finish or 
complete them in the relevant sense. […] There is no outcome whose achievement exhausts them. 
They are not in that way limited.”xxxvi  
 Any functional capacity that plays an ongoing and essential contribution to an atelic activity 
will thus have unrestricted robustness demands because it can never complete its functional 
contribution. Above I claimed that desire-realization is an atelic activity, but of course, heard in 
one way, realizing a desire is the ultimate telic activity. If I have the desire to eat a peach, the telos 
is eating the peach. Eating the peach not only realizes my desire, it also thereby satisfies my desire, 
i.e., it causes me to no longer have the desire. What could be more telic?xxxvii   
 But according to Smith, the function of agency is not to satisfy the agent’s intrinsic desires, 
but “to realize [the agent’s] intrinsic desires, no matter what their content.”xxxviii Successfully 
realizing my intrinsic desires need not satisfy them. After all, our intrinsic desires are for those 
things that we find fundamentally desirable: caring for our family and friends, being a good 
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neighbor, acquiring knowledge, maintaining our health.xxxix We do not engage in realizing our 
intrinsic desires in order to complete realizing our desires; in realizing our intrinsic desires, we do not 
aim at exhausting them—crossing them off a list, as it were. Because of this, the realization of 
intrinsic desires is not something that comes closer and closer to completion the more we realize 
those desires. Even when I one day stop realizing my intrinsic desires, there will be no sense in 
asking how close I was to completing the task, in the way we might sensibly ask how close the 
missile was from the target when it veered off course. From this we can conclude that the function 
of agency is atelic; there is nothing that counts as the capacities constitutive of agency completing 
their functional role.  
 This provides the resources Smith needs to explain why the unrestricted robustness thesis is 
true of agentive capacities. Any capacity that contributes to the performance of a function has 
restricted robustness demands that require it to maintain itself until its contribution to the function 
is completed. Because agentive capacities make ongoing contributions to an atelic function, there 
will be no point after which they need not maintain their ability to contribute.xl So, the unrestricted 
robustness thesis is true of agentive capacities.   
 
IV. INTERDEPENDENCY’S ROLE IN EXPLAINING IMPARTIALITY  
Bukowski has also accused Smith of illicitly relying on moral intuitions to establish the impartiality 
of the constitutive desires to help and not hinder.xli Bukowski claims that Smith’s impartiality result 
relies on what Bukowski calls “the symmetry thesis,” that an “agent’s relationship to other people 
is not relevantly different from her relationship to her future self.”xlii There are clearly some 
dissimilarities in the two relationships, most obviously that one of them is a relationship of identity 
(or at least psychological continuity) while the other is not. Because of this, to establish the 
symmetry thesis, Smith would need to explain why these differences are not relevant. Bukowski 
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identifies one paragraph where he takes Smith to endorse and defend the symmetry thesis, but 
objects that it is insufficient to the task.xliii Without an explanation of what makes a difference 
relevant, Bukowski claims that Smith’s reliance on “the symmetry thesis appears either unmotivated 
or question-begging.”xliv    
 Despite this, the primary argument for Smith’s impartiality result, developed throughout his 
recent work, does not rely on the symmetry thesis, with its general denial of relevant difference. 
Instead, as I’ll show, it appeals to two particular “remarkable symmetries” that hold between an 
agent, her future self, and others.xlv Given this, Smith doesn’t need to show that the acknowledged 
dissimilarities are irrelevant in order to provide an account of the impartiality of the desires 
constitutive of ideal agency.xlvi    
 The first symmetry has to do with control: an agent can only directly exercise her current 
rational capacities, but she can affect both her future desires and beliefs and others’. The second 
symmetry is one of dependence: agents rely on others  and their past selves for both the resources with 
which they exercise their capacities and their non-interference in exercising them.xlvii According to 
Smith, it follows from these two symmetries that there are two ways that an agent could affect the 
future exercise of their capacities: directly, by failing to help or hindering her future ability to exercise 
her capacities, and indirectly, by failing to help or hindering the capacities of another agent, on which 
she will later be dependent.xlviii Because of this, only agents who have the impersonal intrinsic desires 
to help and not hinder are guaranteed to not (intentionally or inadvertently) indirectly frustrate their 
future functioning in this second way. Smith concludes that “if [agents] are robustly to have and 
fully exercise their own capacities to believe for reasons, [they] must desire not to interfere with 
other rational agents’ exercises of their capacities.”xlix  
 We might worry that this conclusion is stronger than warranted. After all, this presupposes 
that the ideal agent is absolutely certain not to hinder their future self. For every agent, there are 
Kathryn Lindeman—Constitutive Resources 
11 
clearly many people on whom she is overwhelmingly unlikely to depend in the future, and the desire 
to help and not hinder those people might be very demanding.  But the robustness thesis is that 
demanding. According to it, ideal agents are not guaranteed to be highly or overwhelmingly likely to 
have what they need to ensure they remain ideal in the future, they are guaranteed to have what 
it takes to remain ideal insofar as it is within their control. Having what it takes to remain ideal is 
a modal notion; it requires having not only what you end up having needed in the actual world to 
remain ideal, but anything you might possibly have needed to remain ideal, no matter how 
implausible it was that you would have needed it. Given that there is no in-principle constraint on 
whom an agent might depend in the future, there is no possible constraint on whose capacities an 
ideal agent will desire to help and not hinder. The modal strength of the demands on ideality and 
the potential dependence of all on all is sufficient for the strong impartiality result.l    
 We might still fear this is too quick. Why wouldn’t the more restricted intrinsic desire to have 
her capacities helped and not hindered be sufficient for the psychology of the ideal agent? After all, 
if an ideal agent knew that a particular instance of helping or not hindering the capacity of another 
agent would realize this desire, she would form the extrinsic desire to help or not hinder that specific 
capacity in this instance. The most straightforward reason is that ideal agents, even were they to 
have full information, would not know facts about the future. Because of this, they could not be 
assured to know when they are in a position to indirectly help or hinder the future exercise of their 
capacities. The agent with the impartial desire to help and not hinder rational capacities is thus 
better equipped to remain ideal, and is thus more ideal.li   
 Despite Bukowski’s focus on the symmetry thesis, Smith need not rely on it to establish the 
impartiality of the desires constitutive of ideal agency.  Instead, I’ve argued that Smith appeals to 
the interdependence of agentive capacities and the robustness thesis together to explain why such 
desires must be impersonal, namely, such desires are needed to guarantee that inter-dependent 
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agents have what it takes to remain ideal insofar as it is within their control. We should thus not be 
concerned that establishing the impartiality of the desires of ideal agents requires implicit appeal 
to moral assumptions.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
I’ve thus defended Smith’s constitutivist account from three objections. In Section II, I showed that 
Smith’s recent reliance on his dispositional account of reasons does not involve an essential 
equivocation on “ideal agent.” In Section III, I developed a strategy that will enable functional 
constitutivists, like Smith, to explain why capacities constitutive of agency are better when they are 
indefinitely self-maintaining. In Section IV, I explained Smith’s reliance on symmetry claims in his 
arguments for the impartiality of the constitutive desires to help and not hinder and showed how 
they involve no moral impartiality assumptions.  
 I am not suggesting that this decisively settles things in Smith’s favor. I’ve provided no 
argument for Smith’s claim that agents have the function of being desire-realizers or that they 
constitutively have the capacities of knowing the world. I’ve also given no reason to think that 
Smith’s earlier dispositional account of reasons is compelling. I haven’t even fully responded to 
Bukowski’s criticisms.lii Importantly, however, none of the defenses I make here turn on the 
successful defense of any of these commitments of Smith’s.   
 The features of Smith’s account that have proven fruitful in this defense provide a blueprint 
for a particularly strong constitutivist account. First, Smith explicitly relies on an independently-
defended account of the nature of reasons to demonstrate the normative significance of the 
constitutive resources he develops.liii This offers a promising strategy to explain the normative 
authority of constitutive resources without relying on substantial normative commitments that the 
constitutivist is committed to explaining within their account.liv Second, Smith explains agency as 
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a functionally-understood kind with constitutive capacities assessable according to their ability to 
contribute to performing the function of agency.lv Any account on which agency has an atelic 
function will be able to provide a similar explanation for why agents ought to self-maintain. Finally, 
Smith understands agents as essentially interdependent, because the exercise of an agent’s 
capacities depends both on their exercise in the past and on the exercise of the capacities of others. 
Any constitutivist who can explain how agents are dependent on each other in performing their 
constitutive function will have resources useful in explaining impartial normative conclusions.lvi  
 In defending these features of Smith’s account, I hope to have demonstrated their power 
more generally. Insofar as philosophy makes progress, it is often by identifying innovative features 
in the views of others and assessing their explanatory strengths, thus recognizing their value 
independently of the success of the theory in which they first appear. This is the methodology at 
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x Michael Bukowski, “A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism,” Ethics 127 (2016): 116-146. 
xi In this sense, it tracks worries raised in Kieran Setiya, “Explaining Action,” Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 339-
93; and Evan Tiffany, “Why Be an Agent?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 223-33.  
xii Bukowski also raises a third objection, the Content Objection, denying Smith’s claim that actions motivated by 
desires to help and not hinder are “strikingly similar” to those we take to be morally required. I won’t address this 
objection. 
xiii Bukowski, “A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism,” 120. “Has what it takes” is not entirely perspicuous, but it is 
hard to rephrase the robustness thesis without it. The point, I think, is that the capacities of ideal agents would not be 
the cause of their own inability to be ideally exercised in the future, if it can be helped.  
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xiv Ibid., 134.  
xv Importantly, the Normativity Objection is an objection to Smith’s ability to show that being constitutive of ideal 
agency is normatively significant. In raising it, Bukowski grants Smith both his dispositional account of reasons and his 
recent arguments that some desires are constitutive of ideal agency. Ibid., 123ff.   
xvi Ibid., 123. 
xvii Ibid., 123-4. In the remainder of this section, I follow Bukowski’s use of these terms. 
xviii Ibid., 123. 
xix Bukowski rejects this possibility because Smith’s earlier argument defending the normative significance of the 
desires of our rational-ideal counterparts relied on their immunity from rational criticism, a feature not shared by kind-
ideal agents. Ibid., 128.  
xx It is thus reminiscent of the Shmagency Objection, in its demand that constitutivist explanations provide a 
normative vindication of the conception of agency. David Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t 
Come from What Is Constitutive of Agency,” Philosophical Review 115 (2006): 169-98. In a recent manuscript, 
“Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails,” (unpublished), Enoch more explicitly addresses Smith’s 
constitutivist account, and presses that Smith is unable answer “the question why we should care about the function 
of agency?”(11) However, Smith need not vindicate the function of agency by demonstrating that we must care about 
it, he only need show that it explains a set of universal reasons. It’s this ability that is at the heart of the Normativity 
Objection.  
xxi It is precisely because Smith thinks ideal agents can have idiosyncratic desires that the possibility of incoherence 
arises. See e.g., Smith, “Constitutivist Promise and Parts,” 16.  
xxii Bukowski also argues that Smith cannot directly establish that the desires to help and not hinder must be had 
by rational-ideal counterparts (“A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism,” 128n30). Such a demonstration would not 
address the Normativity Objection, however, because it would not establish that the status of being constitutive of ideal 
agency was normatively significant.   
xxiii Bukowski comes closest to addressing the simple connection at 128n26, where he acknowledges that 
discovering your kind-ideal counterpart desires something might provide “some evidence” of the desires of your 
rational-ideal counterpart. But here, as elsewhere, Bukowski’s focus is on whether this could show that the desire set of 
your kind-ideal counterpart could be normatively significant. Ibid. 
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xxiv Smith, “Agents & Patients,” 310. 
xxv They are needed to not only fully but ideally exercise their capacities. Fully and robustly exercising capacities is 
not a merely quantitative matter, but is a qualitative matter, determined by the function that the capacities are 
capacities for.    
xxvi Smith, “In Defense of The Moral Problem,” 91. 
xxvii Smith, The Moral Problem, 156-7.   
xxviii Smith addresses the way in which the common desire to have pleasurable experiences could lead to an agent 
without coherence-inducing desires to undermine her deliberative capacities in “Deontological Moral Obligations,” 
355.  
xxix Bukowski, “A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism,” 120.  
xxx Ibid.,133.   
xxxi Ibid. 
xxxii Smith, “The Magic of Constitutivism,” 191; see also Smith, “Agents and Patients,” 315. 
xxxiii Bukowski considers a similar argument for Smith’s atemporal conclusion relying on the temporal extended 
nature of deliberation, which he attributes to an anonymous reviewer, in 130-1n32. Bukowski correctly notes that the 
temporally extended nature of deliberation only ensures a temporally extended robustness requirement, rather than an 
atemporal requirement. The argument I develop in this section accounts for the atemporal, rather than merely 
temporally extended, nature of the normative requirements governing agents. Bukowski, “A Critique of Smith’s 
Constitutivism.” 
xxxiv See Kieran Setiya, “The Midlife Crisis,” The Philosopher’s Imprint 14:31 (2014). The distinction between telic 
and atelic action is often attributed to Aristotle, Metaphysics θ.    
xxxv Setiya, “The Midlife Crisis,” 12.  
xxxvi Ibid., 12-3. 
xxxvii Special thanks are due to Eric Wiland for both this example and pressing the need to address this objection.   
xxxviii Smith, “The Magic of Constitutivism,” 190. 
xxxix Smith, “Deontological Moral Obligations,” 358. 
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xl It doesn’t follow that agentive capacities can’t cause their own destruction, because ceasing to exist isn’t a way 
of becoming worse. See Kathryn Lindeman, “Constitutivism without Normative Thresholds.” Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 12 (2017): 231-258.  
xli Bukowski, “A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism,” 134-7. 
xlii Ibid., 134. 
xliii Bukoswki and I have different readings of this paragraph, found in “Constitutivist Promise and Parts,” 18.  
Rather than defend or rely on the symmetry thesis, I take Smith to be relying on an argument from Parfit against 
incompletely relative theories found in §55 of Reasons and Persons to establish his impartiality result. Smith similarly 
relies on this argument from Parfit in “Agents & Patients,” 321. The argument I develop in this section does not draw 
on this paragraph or rely on Parfit’s argument against incomplete relativity, and so we can thankfully avoid 
adjudicating the interpretative disagreement over this paragraph. Derek Parfit Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press: 1984), 140. 
xliv Bukowski, “A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism,” 135.  
xlv Smith, “Agents & Patients,” 191.   
xlvi We might say that what makes the dissimilarities in question irrelevant is that they are not relevant to the 
argument Smith develops. 
xlvii Of course, in helping or not hindering the exercise of some other agent’s capacities, I might (inadvertently) aid 
their future hindering of the exercise of my capacities. Smith must explain why this does not constitute my undermining 
my future ideal exercise while my failure to indirectly help my future exercise does. Perhaps this is meant to be covered 
by the “insofar as possible” clause. See also Smith’s discussion of the conditional form of these desires in “Deontological 
Moral Obligations,” 358. 
xlviii Smith draws the very strong conclusion that “the possession and exercise of every agent’s desiderative and 
epistemic capacities is thus thoroughly dependent on the possession and exercise of every other agent’s desiderative 
and epistemic capacities, just as thoroughly dependent as any particular agent’s future self’s possession and exercise of 
his desiderative and epistemic capacities is on that of his current self” (“Agents & Patients,” 191). My development of 
Smith’s argument does not rely on this strong claim. 
xlix Smith, “Deontological Moral Obligations,” 357. 
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l Of course, the agent’s own capacities will be among those she impartially desires to help and not hinder. So, 
given that “dominant desires constitutive of being ideal cannot always be co-satisfied,” agents are not in-principle 
prevented from focusing on themselves and those near them, even at the expense of others far away (Smith, “Agents 
and Patients,” 319). I don’t know of a place where Smith discusses interpersonal trade-offs, but he does discuss similar 
conflicts in the intrapersonal case and nothing he says commits him to extreme or implausible trade-offs as the result 
of these impartial desires. Ibid. Thanks to an Associate Editor for drawing my attention to the need to further address 
this concern and those in this section.   
li Additionally, Smith argues that desires must be about what the agent is to do rather than what is to be done. So insofar 
as the desire is that my capacities be helped and not hindered rather than that I help and not hinder my rational capacities, it is of the 
wrong form according to Smith. See Ibid., 320.   
lii Bukowski also criticizes the resulting moral theory as implausibly revisionary. See, “A Critique of Smith’s 
Constitutivism,”137-46. 
liii For a defense of this general strategy of appealing to the nature of reasons to explain the normative significance 
of constitutively-explained features, see Matthew Silverstein “Teleology and Normativity” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics 
11 (2016): 214-240 and Hille Paakkunainen “Doing Away With the ‘Shmagency’ Objection to Constitutivism,” 
Manuscrito 41 (2018): 431-480.   
liv Enoch objects that this type of strategy involves a linguistic solution to a substantial problem: “To the extent 
that you feel the pull of the question—why should we care about the function of agency—you should not be happy 
with the answer ‘because this is what “reason” means’” (“Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails,” 11). I 
don’t see how this amounts to a linguistic solution, though perhaps this objection is more promising in response to e.g. 
Korsgaard’s discussion of the functional role of reason-talk in The Sources of Normativity, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 1996), esp Chapter 3.   
lv Constitutivist accounts classified as “Neo-Aristotelian” most commonly embrace this structure. For a discussion 
of such accounts, see Douglas Lavin, “Forms of Rational Agency,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 80 (2017): 171-
193.  
lvi For constitutivists accounts amenable to this point, see Kenneth Walden, “Laws of Nature, Laws of Freedom, 
and the Social Construction of Normativity,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7 (2012): 37-79, and Kate Manne, 
“Internalism about Reasons: Sad but True?” Philosophical Studies 167 (2014): 189-117.   
